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IV.-THE  USE AND ABUSE OF  FINAL CAUSES. 
IN  preaching the gospel  of  natural science Bacon  told  us 
J'  Natura non nisi parendo vincitur ".  From another point 
of  view Kant replied-"  The understanding makes Nature, 
but does not create it ".  Both sayings contain great truth ; 
but at most they are only half  truths.  Scientifrc discovery is. 
as impossible without  scientific imagination as it is without 
scientific observation.  Man can only  find  what  he  seeks; 
get what he finds is there already.  Countless men had Seen 
apples fall to the ground before  Newton;  and yet  Newton 
alone  discovered  the law  of  gravitation.  Many  s,  photo- 
grapher  bad  found  his  plates  spoilt by  the  X-rays  before 
Döntgen ;  and yet Itöntgen alon~,  discovered the significance 
of their marks.  Nature keeps  her secrets well and can be 
forced to divulge them  only by  the most  strenuous  efforts 
on the part of  man, matara  minister et imterpres ;  and the only 
key with which he csln unlock them is himself, his own ideaa, 
his own interests, his own intellect, his  own will : and  his 
experience reveals to him not only that Nature is intelligible 
-more  or less-to  his intelligence, but pliable to his pr@ctical 
interests, if he but use the proper means.  The gulf  betwixt 
him and Nature he finds to be  not absolute, but bridgeable 
by many ohains of  his own forging.  Puny man  cannot resist 
the force of  the ocean storm or the fire of  the active volcano, 
but he can use the wind to waft bis ships over the sea, and 
the fire to cook his food or drive his engines.  He is at once 
the victim and the msster of Nature, the child end the  maker 
of Nature.  He  not only discovers the truth of  his ideas by 
observing their  agreement with the facts of  Nature, but he 
finds that they work out into practical results.  He  can never 
separate theory  and practice : without  theory  no  practice, 
without practice no theory.  "  Scientia et potentia,"  says 
Bacon, "  in idem coincidunt, quia ignoretio causm  destituit 
iV.  O., i., 3. THE USE  AND ABUSE  OF FIW.AL  CAUSES.  221 
effectum," arid in anofher passege  he quotea with approvd 
the Aristotelien maxirn "  Vere scire est per causes scire," and 
the Aristotelien distinction  of  four causes, Msteria, Porrna, 
Efficiens, et Finis : and then follows hi~3  famous condemna- 
tion of  final causes : "  ex his causa finalis tantum abest ut 
prosit, ut etiam scientias oorrumpat, nisi in hominis actioni- 
bus "-a,  condemnation reinforced af terwards by Spinoza and 
under  certain  limitations  sanctioned  by  Hant, who in his 
Eritik of  Judgment has done more than any other philosopher 
since  Aristotle  to  put  the doctrine  of  final causes  on  its 
proper  basis-with  what success  will  be  considered later. 
To clear the ground however let us  first consider what 
exctctly Bacon meant, and then why Spinoza was so pecdiarly 
opposed to final canse from any point  of  view.  This done, 
Kant will enable us to see how far the idea of  final cause can 
safely be used in scientific investigation and in philosophy- 
what is its use and what its abuse.  And then perhrtps we 
shall be in a  position to cerry his statements a little farther, 
and frslme a more modern doctrine of  our own-in  spite of 
Mr. Brediey's warning  that "  this question of the operation 
of  Ends in Nature is one which, in my judgment, metaphysics 
should leave untouched ". 
The  passages in the De AugmerztZs  Scie?ztiarz~rn,  where Bacon 
deals with final causes, are so often forgotten or misunder- 
stood that it will be well to examine them with some detail. 
These passages occur  when he is speaking of  Natural Phil- 
oaophy, not of  the Doctrina de Homine;  as a matter of fact 
in  the later  portion  of  the treatise,  whexe  he deals with 
man, Lie  never alludes to final causes, although, as we have 
seen in the Novum  Organum, he had  approved their  use "  +lt 
hominis  actionibus".  PhiEosophZa  Natural& Bacon  subdivides 
into Speczllativa, which  is  concerned with  the investigation 
of  caz~ses; and Operativa, which issues in the production  of 
efects.  This SpeouZativa he again divides into Physica, which 
investigates material and efficient  causes;  and  Metaphysica 
(purgato nontim), which investigates formal and final causes. 
Hence has arisen the first misunderstanding of  Bacon's 
meaning.  For his  readers  have  often  forgotten  thslt  his 
own favourite "  forms "not  indeed "  abstraotre,"  but "  irt 
materia  determinata "-he  also  puts  under  Metaphysice 
(purgato  mnzine),  qnd have only  remembered  that he rele- 
gates  final  causes'to Metaphysics-to  what  they  take  tc, 
meen, his limbo for useless notions : whereas in this context 
he really means by the term Metaphysica, what the modern 
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seientist calls abstract Physics as  opposed to applied Physics. 
What Bacon  does  blame  is  the  substitution  of  final  for 
efficient causes ip Physios.  This he explains quite clearly : 
thus in Metaphysics  (p~gato  nont2ne)  you may properly say 
the eyelids with their hairs for s  hedge and rampart are to 
rotect the eyes " ;  or "  the firmness of  animals' skins is to 
Keep  OB  the heat end cold".  But in  Physics  such final 
causes are useless : herein the efficient cauges must be given ; 
thus  IL Hairiness,"  YOU  must  say, "  is wont  to accompany 
the openings of  damp aubstances  (humiditates)>  or  "the 
firmness of  snimals'  skins is  due to the coxitrac ion of  the 
pores in the exterior of  the body owing to  cold and to  the 
exclusion of air (depradatimmm  aeris) ".I  As he says himself : 
"neque  hec eo  dicimus  quod  causse  ill~  finales ver=  non 
sint,  et  inquisitione  admodum  dign~e  in  speculationibua 
Metaphysicse ; sed quia, dum in Physicarum Causarum pos- 
sessiones excurrunt, et irruunt, misere  eam provinciam de- 
populantur et vastant ".  Again what he blames in Aristotle 
is not his use of  final causes as  such, but his attributing final 
causes or design to Nature iilstead of  to God. 
Still worse misunderstood has been  the Passage in which 
Bacon speaks of  the literal unproductiveness of  find causes. 
Bacon had  divided PhiZosop7~ia  Naturalis-it  will be remem- 
bered-into  Speculativa  and  Oye~atiua.  In  the  following 
chapter2 he  goes  an to  speak  of  the latter and says that 
Operativa falls into two divisions : (1) Mechanica, correspond- 
ing to  P?zysica,  which  produces by means of  material  and 
efficient crtuses ; end (2) Hagia, correspondiilg to  M(:taphysioa,, 
which produces by means of  forinal causes.  Then he explsins 
that in this subdivision of  Operativa there is nothing corre- 
sponding to the  metaphysical Cpurgato nomz~e)  investigation of 
final causes : "  nam causarum finaliurn inquisitio sterilis est, 
et tanquam  virgo  Deo  consecrata  nihil parit, i.e. non parit 
Opera ".  Bacon, as the context shows, is here thinkjng of 
Physics and Chemistry, and in this sphere it is obvious that 
final causes can lead  to  no practical applications.  The  bio- 
logical sciences, where alone final causes do lead to practical 
results, have no place in  Bacon's PhiEosophia NaturaEis.  Later 
on  he has indeed something to say about human anatomy, 
where he  advocates both dissection of  corpses and vivisection 
of  animals ; buh curiously enough he nowhere seems to intro- 
duce the conception of  function or adaptation, and certainly 
nowhere introduces the technical term causa fMtaZis.  Simi- 
larly, wben later on he Comes to speak of  Ethics and Politics 
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arid their various subdivisions he has not a word to say about 
Final Causes, although he approved in the Novwm  OT~CGTZ~, 
as we have Seen, of  their use in. hsminis occtirm.ibus. 
In fact the only connexion of  Bscon with the doctrine of 
final oauses is accidental.  He blames their use in Physics ; 
he approves  of  their use in Metaphysics = (purgato nontim) 
our  modern  abstract Physics.  But he never explains how 
they  are to be sought for in his own Metaphysica.  Thus 
bot& his rejection and admission  of  final causes have been, 
as a rule, misurlderstood  by writers on logical theory, who 
have been wont to  assign him a place out of  all proportion 
to the importance of  his statements about them.  Reslly he 
throws no light whatsoever  either upon their use or abuse. 
Spinoea's rejection of  final causes is much more uncom- 
promising : but  a  careful exsmination  of  his meaning will 
show that he rejects their  use  ex  analogia hominis, as Bacon 
put it, not ex  analogia wziversi.  In fact, of  their  scientific 
use  he has nothing to say:  for in  science he adopts the 
thoroughgoing mechanism of Descartes, and  with the bio- 
logical sciences he has nothing to do.  In his time they can 
hardly be said  to have existed.  All  his arguments against 
the scientific and philosophical abuse of  final causes he has 
collected together in a brief  appendix to the first part  of  his 
Ethica.  There Spinoza traces the seerch for final csuses to 
the anthropocentric  tendency  of  human  thought.  "  Men 
comnionly suppose," he says, "  that all tbings in Nature act, 
like  themselves, for a purpose ; insomuch that they  make 
sure that God himself  orders all things for  some fixed end ; 
for they say thet God  made  all  things for man's  sake and 
man to worship him.  The origin and ground  of  this belief 
is  that men, being  .ignorant  of  the real cmses of  things  and 
hrtving a desire to seek their own interest, think themselves 
free to act with a view to the desired  end.  Of  this desired 
end they are oonscious, but they know not the causes which 
arouse the desire.  Thus they come to regard the final cause 
or purpose of  an action as a necessary and suficient explana- 
tion of  that &ction.  But if  in  the crtse of  another person's 
action they can  get no  positive information of  its purpose, 
they  are  obliged  to  guess  from the  analogy  of  their  own 
motives by which they have on other  occasions been deter- 
mined to actions of  a  simiiar kind.  Then findirig  so many 
things in nature useful for human life-the  eyes for seeing, 
the teeth for  masticating, vegetables  aud animds for food, 
the sun for light, the sea for feeding fishea, etc.-they  regard 
all things as instrurnents for  man's use; and knowing that 
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that  some ruler of  the  world, having freedom  like thaf  of 
human agents, must have made them of  set purpose for  the 
benefit of  mankind."  Convinced that Nature does nothing 
in  vain,  i.e.  without regard  for  the use of  mankind;,rnen 
persuaded themselves that all Nature's inconveniences-'.like 
storms, earthquakes, plagues, etc.--were  sent them  as pun- 
ishments  for  wrongdoing.  And,  says  Spinoza, "  though 
experience  did  every  day protest,  showing  by  numberless 
examples  that  conveniences  and  inconveniences befall  the 
pious and iiilpious alike, they found it easier to assume that 
mischievous  things had  unknown  uses  than to reconstruct 
their habits of  thought ; and so made the further assumption 
that  the  counsels o£ God  were  far beyond  human  under- 
standing ". 
Spinoza proceeds to  bring forward  further a.rguments to 
show  that  "  omnes  Causa  finales  nihil  nisi  humana  esse 
figmenta ".  Arnong  these arguments are : (1)  that it is tu 
mistake  effect  for  cause and  vice  versd;  (2) that it makes 
what  is by  nature prior, posterior ; and  (3) that it makes 
what is most  perfect  and  supreme, most irnperfect : for if 
God acts for an end, it must needs be  that God desires some- 
thing which  he lacks and ipso facto is imperfect.  Moreover 
upholders  of  final  causes  defend  their  doctrine by  a new 
method  of  arguing-by  reduction, not  ad  impossibiZe, but ad 
Qignmantiam.  For example, a tile falls from a roof  on a man's 
head  and kills him : the tile, they  argue, must have fallen 
on pnrpose to kill him.  Otherwise, if  it had not been God's 
will,  how  could  al1 the circumstances have  concurred  just 
then and there 3  You  may  answer : It happened because 
the wind blew aild the man was  passing that way.  They 
will urg-Why  did  the wind  blow  and  why  did  the man 
pass  that way  just  at  that  time?  Lf  you  suggest fresh 
reasons,  they  will ask  similar  questions,  because  there is 
no  end of  such questioning, until you  take  refuge in  that 
igmrantk asylunt, the will  of  Qod. 
Finally  Spinoza goes  on to explain that current notions 
of  good and evil, order and chaos, beauty and ugliness, etc., 
are relative  to men's  Organs  and  dispositions.  Thus men 
call whatever conduces to  their own well-being good ;  what- 
ever  is the opposite of  this  bad.  And  becanse  those who 
do not understand  the nature of  things, have nothing true 
to  say  abont  them,  but only  imugina things  and  misteke 
their imaginat.ions for understanding-on  that account they 
are firmly convinced of  an wder in things.  For  those things 
which are of  such a sort that, when they are present to our 
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remembered  easily, men  are apt to call well-ordered; and 
things of  a contrary sort, ill-ordered or confused.  This good 
order  they attribute to a  beneficent  Deity, quite forgetting 
the infinity of  things which surpass our feeble imaginations. 
And thus it is that good and bad, beautiful and  ugly, etc.- 
notions  which  are nothing but  human ways  of  imagining 
things,-come  to be considered  by the ignorant  ss the most 
important propsrties of  th.i?ags themsel~es. 
In  the  Same  way  Spinoza would  answer  the  common 
diEculties conceyning his doctrine of  the perfection  of  the 
universe.  If, it s objected, everything is the result of  God's 
perfection, whence come the many imperfections of  Nature 
-corruption,  ugliness, disorder, evil, sin?  These, Spinoza 
anewers,  are  merely  human  ways  of  imagining  things. 
"  For  the  perfection  of  things,"  he  says,  "is  to  be  esti- 
mated  from  theip- own nature and power  alone : and  things 
are not more or  less perfect becctuse  they  delight or offend 
the senses of  men, or because they are convenient or repug- 
nant to human nature.  I£  any ask, why  God  did  not;  so 
oreafe men that they should be governed by reason alone, I 
answer but this : because  he lacked  not matter for  creating 
all  things-from  the highest  down  to the lowest  degree o£ 
perfection : or to speak more exactly-becanse  the laws of 
his own  Nature were so vast as to si~ffice  for producing all 
things which can  be conceived by an infinite understanding." 
Here  Spinoza  leaves  his  arguments-arguments  all 
directed against  causaz SnaZes  ex anazogia homi?tis, interpreted. 
in terms of human interests-against  whet Kant, as we shall 
see, calls external ends as opposed to internal ends-against 
ideals not yet real but to be realised.  Bor to Spinoza God 
and  the universe,  as in God,  are perfect  ivepyely  and  are 
never  more  or  less perfect:  so there  can  therefore  be  no 
future realisation of  an end, because  all is perfect as it is. 
For hirn there is no etSoc existing only  SVU&CL,  whose ~~XOF 
it is to be reaIised  iv~p~eiy:  for ii the universe be taken as 
a whole, it is already  and always ivepyeiq  &V.  In Spinoza's 
universe there is no place for change or development ; all is 
real and actual.  It  is .r~XeZov  already, because God is ~~heier  ; 
and thus the etSoq is the TEXOF and the .rPXoc is the ~i609. 
Thus final causes are to Spinoza mere  illusions, first  be- 
cause they are h.~cmana  figme7tta-not  the real causes or real 
properties  of  things,  which  are only  ascertainable by  the 
mathematical sciences;  seco?xZZy, becauae in defiance of  ex- 
~erience  they interpret all things in terms of  human utility 
and convenience, whereas there is no reason to suppose thttt 
man is the centre of the universe ;  and thirdly, because they 
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are inconsistent  with his own  conception  of  God  and  the 
universe, which  admits neither  of  time nor change nor im- 
perfection.  But we may ask, are final  causes any more or 
less hu~m  figmenta than the mechanical and mathematical 
conceptions of  science, which Spinoza  assumes  to be  real 
properties  of  things?  Again,  are  final  causes  necessaril~ 
interpreted in terms of  human utility and convenience ?  and 
finally  are time,  change  and imperfection  mere  illusions, 
merely relative to man? 
Kant's treatment of  final causes in the second part of  the 
Er.itik  of  Judgme?tt will help us towards a  Solution of  all three 
.difficulties  : he has once and for  all settled the logical place 
.of final causes in the biological sciences.  He drews a, clear 
.arid important distinction between internal and external ends 
or purposes.  In the  latter sense final cause is utility,  e.g. 
iron is useful to men for ship-building, and with final cause 
in this external sense the biological  sciences heve  nothing 
to do.  By internal end Eant signifies the function or func- 
tions in an organism which the verious Organs are adapted 
to  fulfil,  e.g.  sight is the internal end of  the eye, hearing of 
fhe ear, the mature animal of  the embryo.  '  For ex ample, 
J I 
says Kant,' "  a  tree may in three ways be so regarded as an 
end to itself  or internal end.  (1) A tree gellerates another 
tree according to known  laws.  But the  tree produced  is 
of  the same genus; and so  it produces  itself  ge?zerz'caZly :  for 
in the  genus  it as effect  is continually  produced  by  itself, 
and as  cause  continually maintains its generic  existence by 
repeated  self-production.  (2) A  tree produces itsejf  as an 
individual.  This kind of  effect we caIl growth ; but growth 
is quite different from any increase according to mechanical 
laws, and is just generation under another name.  In  adding 
to its bulk  the tree first  communicates  to the new matter 
which it absorbs a characteristic quality, which cannpt be 
bestowed by the mechanism of nature without it ; and' thus 
the tree develops itself by aid  of  a material, which as to its 
mode of  cornposition is its own product.  For though, as re- 
spects the constituents got from  nature without, such material 
must be regarded as having merely  a derived existence ; yet 
in the Separation and recombination of  this raw material the 
tree displays  an originality with which  art cannot  attempt 
to cope. . . . (3) The parts of  the tree produce each other 
in such a wey that the maintenance of  any one part depends 
reciprocally on the maintenance of  the rest.  The b-ud or scion 
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vegetrtble and animal.  But the distinction between reflective 
and determinant judgment, or its Synonyms regulative  and 
coxlstitutive judgment, goes back to the Kantian epistemology 
-to  his  own  arbitrary distinction  between  Understanding 
and Reason, according to which  efficient  causality is a  con- 
ception of  the Understanding, but final causality an idea of 
the Reason.  According to this doctrine, the ultimate laws 
of  Nature,  like  causality,  substance  and reciprocity,  are  a 
priori, universal and  necessary,  and as such are conceptions 
of  the  Understanding,  which,  though  they  become  con- 
sciously known  in  the Course of  our experience, are in no 
sense derived from experience, buk  are a priori  principles  of 
sgnthesis  which  the Understanding  irnposes  upon  Nature 
and  by aid  of  which  the Understanding produces  order and 
system out  of  the chaos  of  sense-perceptions.  Yet  at the 
Same time that Xant Claims this a p?-iori origin for the most 
ueneral laws of Nature, he  admits the empirical origin of  all  D 
the more special laws of  Nature, like, e.g., the law of  gravita- 
tion and the laws of  motion, though he 1s unable to give us 
any difYerentia, whereby to distinguish the one class of laws 
from the other.  In fact we  have here come upon  the weak 
point  in Xant's whole theory  of  natural science.  By a sort. 
of  circi~lar  argument he  assumes  that these most  general 
Iaws  of  Nature are a prioyi, because  they are universal and 
necessaiy ; and that tbey are universal and necessary, because 
they are n prior?;.  Re does not appreciate the significance of 
Hurue's distinction between relations of  ideas to one another 
and matters of  fact, and  so fails to See that the necessity of 
&I1 natural laws, so far as they have any necessiiy at all, ia 
only logical, not real, necessity.  In other words he does not 
realise the full significance  of  the ideality of  tlie  subject- 
matter of  all the natural sciences, tl-iat no science deals with 
the  concrete  individual  of  perceptual  experience  as  such, 
Imt only with certain aspects common  to many individual';, 
which are sbstracted ideally from their pclrticular surround- 
ings; and that it is in this sense that science, as Aristotle 
said, is always of  the ~a86hov,  never of  the ~oc@&caara. 
We  shall understand this better i£  we take Kant's category 
of  causality as our  example, the category which he regards 
as khe 111ost  fundamental of  all the laws of  Nature.  Hume, 
testing the conception by reference to our sense perceptions, 
had  reduced  causality to  invariable  succession;  end  the 
necessary connexion regarded by philosophers  as underlying 
our  conception,  he  mrtintained,  was  only  a mental fiction 
due to the arbitrary association of  our ideas of  actual causes 
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fiction, but a mental principle of synthesis, and that without 
causality ss a, prius we could never attain to the idea of  suc- 
cession  at a11.  But if Nature be  taken  in its  mechanical 
aspect only, as consisting of the primary qualities of  matter, 
Hume's  analysis  is  perfectly right.  In this  mechanical 
world  causality, so  far as  natural  science  can  know it, is 
mere  succession;  and  tlie  causality  which  Kant  would 
attribute to Nature is  the efficient  causality which we  are 
conscious  of  in the  actions  of  our  own  wills.  Whethex 
ultimately we  are justified  in attributing ex aanalogia hominis 
the Same or similar causality to Nature is a fuither question 
snd  a  metaphysical  question.  But  with  such  causelity 
mechanical  science  as  such has nothing to do: it can  get 
on  better without  assuming it and  entia non  sunt  mzJtipZi- 
canda prater vzecessitatenz.  In fact,  if  by  Nature  we  mean 
the Nature of  mechanical science (and this is what Kant in 
this context does mean by Nature), causality in its full sense 
is not  a,  constitutive principle or  determiiiant judgment  at 
all,  So long as we  stick to quantities causality  is merely 
the  invariable  seqnence  of  consequent  upon  antecedent, 
nothing more nor less: for such sequence alone  admits  of 
mathernatical  determination  in  terms  of  number  and 
quantity.  Really,l  the  objects  of  all mecharrical  sciences 
are not the things of  common experience as such at all, but 
only one particular  aspect  of  them, namely, their primary 
qualities ;  and  this aspect, like all other partioular aspects, is 
arrived st by mental abstraction and construction.  Equally 
true is it that the mechanical explanation or descxiption of 
these primary qualities, when it  1s  glven, is just  as  much 
a mental product.  Though it deals with matter and motion, 
it is expressed in  terms  of  law, nurnber,  or  measure-all 
three  of  them mental produots.  But so' soon  es we pass 
from  quantitative  to  qualitative  Vrelations  and  changes, 
causality merely as succession is not sufficient.  As a work- 
ing hypothesis  we  find ourselves forced  f;o use  the  notion 
of efficient causality, of  the power  to produce, as when we 
observe  the  heat  of  the  sun  melting  wax.  Mechanical 
science of  Course atteiupts to reduce qualitative to quantita- 
tive relations ;  but when it is unable to do so-and  in many 
cases it is unable-then  it can hardly move  a step without 
the working hypothesis  or concepkion of  efficient causality. 
In  Kantian language we use efficient causality as a, heuristic 
principle,  going  beyond  our  sense-perceptions  in  order  to 
reduce  their  manifold  to unity.  Only,  as  we  have  Seen 
Cp. Sturt's Personal Idealis?~~,  p.  207. already, Kant is nor; content with calling the law of  causality 
a  mere  heuristic principle.  He calls it  a  category of  the 
Understanding, which the Understanding uses in its creation 
of Nature, and which, as an a priori  principle  of  synthesis, 
is just  as universal  and  necessary  as are the laws  of  logic 
and mathematics.  But for science, whatever it may  be for 
metaphysics, we maintain that this is just  what it is not. 
As Paulsen puts it,l "in physics we have to reckon with  an 
irrational factor, which renders it impossible to decide upon 
the  truth  of  propositions  by  means  o£  Inere  immanent 
reflexion ; we  must  consult  sense-observation.  And  this 
irrational factor  does  not  disappear  even  in  the ultimate 
principles.  It is attached to the laws of  biology and  chem- 
istry, arid-likewise to the laws of  mechanics. . . . mat  they 
need  is a working maxim for  their investigation, and they 
have that in the law  of  .causality or the principle  of  the 
uniformity of  nature,  even if  it is  not  a law of  the pure 
understanding, but  merely  a principle  constructed  by  the 
understanding on  the brtsis  of  the datum and found to be 
useful. " 
So when we passrfrom  physics and chernistry to biology- 
to the  science  of  organisms, our logical procedure is exactly 
the Same.  Organisms  as concrete particular individuals are 
not possible objects of  science at all, until we can discover 
what cömmon qualities they possess.  These common qualities 
we can in thought  abstract from the particular individurtls 
possessing  them, and  according  to their  different natures 
they fall within the scope of different sciences, each of  which 
in its investigetions uses its own appropriate principles (161~~ 
Ap~ai)  or working hypotheses.  So far as orgenisms exhibit 
mechanicrtl  properties,  these  proyerties,  these quantitative 
reletions, are dealt with by the mechanical sciences of  num- 
ber and measure, where  causality as mere succession reigns 
supreme.  Again,  so  far  as  organisms  possess  chemical 
qualities, they are dealt with by chemistry ; and when these 
chemical  qualities  defy analysis in  terms of  quantitv, then 
the chemist finds himself obliged to introduce  efficient  or 
productive  causality  as his working hypothesis,  simply  be- 
ccluse his own and others' ex  erieaice proves it to be useful. 
Pinally organisms, over and a  %  ove these primary and second- 
arg qualities, exhibif the adaptation of  Organs  to functions ; 
and here the only fruitful principle that the biologist cazi use  \ 
is the conception  of final cauae-of  the adaptation of means 
to ende, which like the principle of  efficient causaljty and in- 
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deed all other scientific principles, has its basis in our own 
experience,.in this case, the experience of  our own conscious 
rtdaptation of  means to ends in our voluntary ections.  But 
he need  not, in fact he does not;, use the conception in its 
entirety-at  least for  the  purposes of  his science.  For though 
he cannot  get on without  the conception  of  adaptation of 
means to ends, he need  not, as a biologist, assume in the 
organisms with which he is  dealing, self-conscious personal 
subjects, who purposely  design means to carry out precon- 
ceived ends.  Such an assumption is quite unnecessary, be- 
cause it is not required for his interpretation of  the observed 
facts of  his science.  It  is not an element in the  abstract concep- 
tion of  organism, which ex hypofhesi  stands  as the  fundamental 
conception of his science.  On the other hand the sociologist in 
investigating the facts of  human society makes the conception 
of  purposively acting self-conscious agents the starting-point 
qr  working hypothesis of  all his subsequent researches.  Such 
then is the logical  place of  final cause in biological science : 
it  is the appropriate  conception which  the nature of  the 
subject-matter forces  the mind  to use in  its investigittion 
of  the  adaptation of  means to ends in organisms,  and its 
justification  is simply its success.  No biologist can get  on 
without it ;  the written works of  all biologists from Aristotle 
to Sir Michael Foster are fuIl of  it. 
But before we leave the place  of  final causes in biology, 
there is  one other point  to  be  noticed,  which  goes far to 
explain the prejudice still found in modern soientists ctgainst 
them.l  This point is that the conception  of  final cause has 
oftften  led  to the discovery  of  the efficient-  and  mechanical 
causes,  as,  e.g.,  in the  case  of  Harvey's  discovery  of  the 
circulation  of  the blood;  and that  as the latter done are 
practically useful, final cause may be neglected  as the mere 
scaffolding to the mein building.  Thus Robert Boyle  tells 
us : "I remember that when I asked ow: famous Harvey, 
what  were  the things  which induced  him  to think  of  a 
circulation of  the blood, he answered me that, when he took 
notice that the valves  in the veins  of  so many parts of  the 
body  were so placed,  that they gave a free passage to the 
biood  towards the heart,  but  opposed  the passage  of  the 
venal  blood  the contrary way-he  was incited  to imagine 
that so provident a  cause as Nature had not placed so many 
valves  withozlt  desigrr,  and no design seemed more probable 
than thet the blood should be sent through the erteries and 
Cp.  Sigwart, Logic, Eng. Trans., ii., 172. 
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Course that way ".  Harvey's  observation of  the function or 
final causes of  these valves led him  to the investigation of 
the mechenical  problem,  how,  when  so  much  blood  was 
forced out of  the heart at each beat of it, the supply of  blood 
was yet maintained, and to this problem he  discoveied  the 
mechanical  solution in  the circnlation  of  the blood.  Now 
the description of  mechanical causes always admits of  much 
greater precision -often  mathematical precision-  than the 
description  of  final causes, and moreover mechanical causes 
come  first in the order of  production  and  are therefore  of 
more practical use.  But, as Sigwarh points out,l so far from 
there being any inconsistency between the two points of  view, 
"  the final concept  does not contradict the causal treatment, 
but insists upon  it  Tfie  end  P is  the joint  product  of 
oertain efficient causes abc, working in relation to each other, 
and  the mind  of  the investigator  can  travel according  to 
convenience  either backwards  from P to  abc, or  forwards 
from abo to P.  Here  ''  the importance  of  the final concept 
rests only upon  the fact  that  it  expresses  the unity of  a 
system of  parts which are such that when taken in isolation 
we are unable to deduce this particular cornbination (P)  from 
their nature ".  This procedure is precisely like the procedure 
in geometry when we assume the problem already solved with 
the view of  discovering geometrical means to its solution. 
Enough however  has now been  said to prove  the utility 
of  the concept of  "  internal " final cause in biological science ; 
for if  it can  be  shown to be  useful, no other justific&tion  ifii 
needed  for  its  scientific  ado~tion-any  more than for  any 
other scientific working  hypothesis.  But the evolutionary 
biologist  cannot  stop here:  for  he is  concerned3 not only 
with (1) "  the universal  essence  upon  which  the organic 
is grounded " snd (2)  "its laws of  development,"  but  also 
with (3) "  the externe1 causes m-hich  determine it in this or 
that direction ".  Here  he  cannot indeed  avoid  the appli- 
kation  of  the oonception  of  "external"  final  cause  as  a 
working hypothesia for his study of  the env2ronmeltt of  organ- 
isms,  but  he hds  its clpplication  far  less  successful  anti 
universal.  As Eant puts it74  '"  the internal form  of  a mere 
blade  of  gress  is  sufficient  to show  that  for  our  human 
feculty of  judgment  its origin is possible  only according to 
the rule of  purposes.  But if we  ohange  our point  o£ view 
and look to the use which  other natural beings nirtke  of  it, 
1  Sigwert, ii.,  p.  176. 
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a;baiidon  the consideration of its internal organisation  and 
only  look  to its  externally  purposive  references,  we  shall 
arrive at no categorical purpose.  . . . Hence it is only so far 
as matter is orgailised that it necessarily carries with it the 
concept  of  a natural purpose, because this, its  specific form, 
is at the same time a product of  nature.  But this concept 
Ieads izecsssavily to the idqa  of  collective nature as a system 
in  accordance  with the rule of purposes."  In other words 
the biologist is led to make the assumption that "  everything 
in the world  is in some way good  for sornething: nothing is 
vain in it ".  "  By the example that nature gives us  in its 
organic products we are justified, "  l says Hant, "  nay, called 
upon,  to expect  of  it  and of  its laws cothing that is not 
purposive on the whole."  Then the assumption of  external 
purposiveness  once made,  the only way  to justify  it is  to 
discover how  far it works.  "  There is," says Hant,""  only 
one external purposiveness which  is connected  with  the in- 
ternal purposiveness  of  organisation,  and yet  serves in  the 
external reletion of  a rneans to a purpose, without the question 
necessarily  arising-to  what  end  this being  so  organised 
must  have existed.  This is the organisation  of  both  sexes 
in their mutual relation for  the propagation of  their kind; 
since l-iere we can always aslr, Why must such a pair  exist ? 
The answer is : This pair first constitutes an o?.ga?risi?zg  whole, 
though not an organised whole in a single body." 
Similarly the conception of  external purposiveness is useful 
as a  principle  of  synthesis  in tracing  the development  of 
plants and anirnals in relation  to  their environment.  The 
biologist uses the conception in  studying the adaptation  of 
the eye to the properties  of  light,  of  the teeth  of  various 
animals  to  their  varying  lrinds  of  food,  of  the  Organs  of 
locoruotion to the varying modes of  traversing space and its 
obstacles.  He uses itagain in the study of  animal instincts, 
e.g.,. the building instincts of  wasps, bees, birds, beavers ;  or 
agam the instincts of  concealment  amid their  surroundings 
found in so many insects, animals, and plants.  But in all 
such cases he takes for the end subserved  the preservation 
of the life and health of the animsl or plant in question. 
But when  we extend the conception of  external cause to 
nature as a whole, we find es many dedtructive as preserva- 
tive agencies.  The waste of  nature staggers the most down- 
right  optimist.  War,  pestilence  and  femine  are  as  rife 
among  animals  and  plants  as arnong  men;  and  even  if 
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struggle for existence not only the fittest  but the best alwa~s: 
survive  and  that  the Progress  is ever  upwards,  still  thh. 
Progress is bought at a most frightful cost of  pain, suffering. 
and  death, not merely of  individuals, but of  whole races of 
plants and animals.  Such problems however are moral and. 
metaphysical and have nothing to do with the logic of  final 
causes in the biological sciences.  In  these sciences the con- 
ception of  final cause, in the externe1 applicetions just briefly 
indicated,  is as much  a methodological  postulate  es in its 
internal applications : and  its justification  aepends here also 
solely  upon  its utility.  Here  also  its use  is  analogical-- 
drawn from our  conscious subordination of  means to ends. 
in  our  voluntary  actions;  and  in using  it  the  biologist 
reasons  as if  Nature were  an intelligent  agent consciously 
selecting adequate means to preconceived ends.  At the Same. 
time he is or should be well  aware of  the limitations to its 
legitimste use.  Re uses it to reduce to unity the manifold 
facts, observed through sense perception, of plant and animal 
life, and for the purposes of his science he need not postulate 
that Nature is an intelligent cause in the same sense as he 
knows himself  ta  be  intelligent, nor yet  that  Nature  pre- 
conceives her ends in idea, which she purposes to make real 
in fact, in the Same way that he kiimself  proceeds in his own 
voluntary actions.  His science does not need such assump-. 
tions, and if  made, they produce confusion and illusion ;  and 
for this reason biology will have none of  them, and rightly so. 
Buh even the biologist is a man, and every man, we know, 
is  a metaphysician.  So what  are mere postulates to  the 
biologist become the gravest problems to the metaphysician. 
The latter asks, how are they possible ? what do they imply ? 
and Kanf himself in an appendix to the Retik of  the Judgment 
goes far to propound a solution, though he never worked out 
his ideas. 
Kant's  stsrting point  is  the  necessity  of  the conception 
of  final cause in the sciences of  organic 1ife.l  (1) For the. 
refE~otive  judgment,"  ho says, "  it is therefore quite s  correct 
fundamental proposition,  that for that connexion of  things 
according to final  causes which  is  so  plain,  there mwst  bee 
tl~otqht  s ceusality  distinct  from  that  of  mechanism,  viz., 
that of  an (intelligent) cause of  the world acting in accord- 
ance with  purposes, but  (2) for  the  determinamt  judgment 
this would  be  a hasty and unprovable proposition.  In the 
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the concept  of  that oausality is a mere 'idea,' to which we 
by  no means underteke  to concede reality; but which  we 
use  aa  a guide  to reflexion, which remains therebg always 
Open  to all mechanical grounds of  explanation and does not 
withdraw out of  the world of  '  se?~se'.  In the second case 
the proposition would  be an objective principle prescribed 
by reasm, to which the determinant judgment must subject 
itself, whereby however it withdraws beyond  the world  of 
sense  into the transcendent  and  perhaps  is led  into error." 
As to the existence of  final causes in nature, Kant points 
out, four views have been  prevalent  in philosophy : two he 
calls Idealist, end two Realist ; the two former denying and 
the two latter adrnitting their real existence. 
(1) The Idealists explain final causes away as an illusion : 
either (a)  ,  like Democri  tus and Epicurus, reducing everything 
to mechanical csusation without  atternpting to  account for 
the delusion ;  or (P),  like Spinoza,  reducing find purposiveness 
to fatality, and explaining the illusion of  mutual adaptation 
in things as due to the unity of  the substratum of  all natural 
things. 
(2) The Realists are either (a)  Rylozoists who explain the 
purposes in Nature-upon  the analogy  of  a faculty acting 
with design-by  the  life of  matter, a  world-soul, anim  mundi ; 
or (ß) Theists, who explain them as derived from an intelli- 
gent Being, a God, who produces them with design.  Kant, 
as we shall See, holds to the last view  as a matter OE  faith, 
buk  denies that it is a  provable  proposition.'  It is not prov- 
able because "  the concept of  a causality of  nature according 
to the rule of  purposes, still more of  a Being such as cannot 
be given us in experience  (i.e., through  sense-perception)- 
e Being who  according to the rule of  purposes is cause of 
Nature-though  it is thinltable without contradiction, is not 
to be  dogmatically esserted: for  it is neither  derived  from 
experience nor necessery (i.e.,  like causality) to the possibility 
of  experience ".  It is not however  a matter  of  blind feith, 
but of a faith based on a  critical analysis of  scientific method : 
We cannot," says Xant,2 "  otherwise think end  make com- 
prehensible the purposiveness  which must lie at the bottom 
of  our knowledge  of  the inner possibility of  many natural 
things then by representing it and the world in general  as 
a product of  an intelligent cause (a God)." 
So far and no farther Kant's critical analysis carries him ; 
but after all he does not rest content wi th his own conclusion. 
Reason, as distinct from understanding, demands more than a mere reflective principle  of  judgment ; and Kant attempts 
to  satisfy these  demands  by  edmitting the possibility-in 
the sense of iiriplying no inherent  contradiction-both  of an 
intelligent cause of  Nature and of  a  supreme end of  Nature. 
The former is God, the second is inan.  How then does Kant 
&rrive  at meking man the supreme end of Nature ? 
As  a natural organism Kant is never  weary of  pointing 
out tbat man is no  more the end  of  nature than any other 
organlsm.  "  Nature," he saysll "  has not taken him for her 
special  darling  and favoured  l-iiin  with blessjngs  above  all 
animals.  Rather,  in  her  destructive  operations-plague, 
hunger, perils of  waters, frost, assaults of  other animals great 
and siilall, etc.-in  these things she has spared hirn as little 
as any other animal.  . . , Man  is then always only a link in 
the chain  of  natural purposes-is  a  means for the mainte- 
nance of  purposiveness  in the inechanism of  the rernaining 
links. " 
How then, once more we ask  him, is he Nature's supreme 
end ?  "  As the only being on earth," IGnt answers, "  which 
has an understanding and consequently  a  faculty of  setting 
arbitrary purposes before itsel£,=  he is certainly entitled to be 
the lord  of  Nature ; and ifeNature be regarded es a,  teleo- 
logical system, he is by his destination the ultimztte  purpose 
of  Nature.  But this is szlbjact  to the co~zditio?~  of  his having an 
understanding and the will to give to it and to hiinself such 
a reference to pui-poses as can be  self-sufficient imdepende?ztly 
of  Nature, and consequently can be  a final purpose ; which 
final  purpose  however  must  not  be  sought  in  Nature 
itself."  . 
Obviously  man's  happiness  is  not  the supreme end of 
Nature : for "  the value of  life3 for US,  if we  estimate it  by 
that which  7ue  e~zjoy (by the natural end of  all our desires 
which  is  happiness), is  easy  to reckon.  If  is  less  than 
nothing."  But  there is  another  supreme end  possible- 
man's culture and moral  discipline; and from this point  of 
view we can  regard  Kature as a means to man  as its end, 
and we  can See  "  what  Nature  can  do  for man to prepare 
hirn for that which  he must do  for himself  in order to be 
the final end ".* 
Prom  the  point  of  view  of  cz6Ztz~re  Nature tends to  de- 
velop man's power  of setting ends to himself and  his capa- 
city to make  out of  his  life an ordered  whole, by  putting 
hirn in war and competition with his fellow-men-strenuous 
conditions which impel him  to self-reliance  and inventive- 
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ness.l  Thus,  says Kant,2 "  this splendid misery  is bound 
up with the development of  the natural capacities of  the 
human race, and the purpose of Nature itself, although not 
our purpose  (i.s., happiness), is attained."  From the point 
of  view  of  discipline Nature  only  indirectly helps  to make 
man  "  receptive  of  higher  purposes  than  she can  herself 
supply, and to free his  will from the despotism of  desires 
throi-igh the experience  which  he gains of  the benefits of 
self-mastery  and the evils entailed by the loose indulgence 
of his natural inclinations  It is then  not  as  a natural, 
but  only  "  as a  moral,  being  that man  can  be  the  final 
purpose  of  creation  Why  3  Because,  says  Kant, in 
him  alone  we  find  "  teleological  causality,"  uiz.,  he  alone 
sets up ends befora  himself ; and because  "man  alone re- 
presents  the law according  to which  he has to  determine 
purposes for himself  (the moral law), as unconditioned  and 
independent  of  all  natural conditions ".6  "  If now  things 
of  the world,  as beings  dependent  in their  existence, need 
a supreme cause  acting according to purposes, man is the 
supreme end of  creation ; since without him there would  be 
no  ultimate  point  in  Nature  to which  the chain  of  sub- 
ordinate  ends  could  be  attached.  Only  in man and only 
in him as subject of  morslity do we meet with unconditioned 
legislation  in  respect  of  purposes,  which  therefore  alone 
renders  hirn  capable  o.f  being  a  final  end  or purpose,  to 
which the whole  of  Nature is teleologically subordinated." 6 
Here K&nt leaves  the question  of  man as  the supreme 
end of  Nature to pass to the queation of  the intelligent cause 
of  Nsture. 
Physical teleology, according to Kant, can never become 
a  physico-theology, though  it is  of  great value  as  a  pro- 
paedeutic  to th&ology.  At  most  it  can only7 "  justify  the 
concept  of  an  intelligent  world-cauae, as  a  subjectiue  con- 
cept  (only available  for  the constitution  of  our  theoretical 
faculty)  of  the  possibility  of  things  that  we  can  make 
intelligible to ourselves according to purposes ; but it cannot 
determine  this concept  further ; and  it cannot  determine 
this  concept  further,  because  the  purposive  reference  in 
physical  teleology  is and  must  be  always  considered  only 
as  conditioned  in  Nature, and  it consequently  cannot in- 
quire into the purpose  for which  Nature itself  exists  (for 
which the ground must be sought ozbtsde Nature).  Physical 
teleology  does  indeed interpret  natural purposes  according 
Caird, Karrt, ii.,  p.  501.  § 83.  "  888. 
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to the analogy of  our own voluntary activities ; but as su*, 
it  cannot tell  us whether the agent is really imteZlige?zt, or 
prfect, or even whether it is one. "  On the contrary,  with all 
our knowledge of Nature it remains quite undecided whether 
the supreme cause is an all-wise and all-moral GFod  or only 
an "  understanding determined by  the niere necess.ity of its 
nature to the production  of  certain forrns (according to the 
analogy of whst we call the art-imstinct in ani~nals)  ".l 
The question  therefore  can  only  be  solved by  moral the- 
ology.  Only as a moral being, Kant has already shown us, 
can nian be  the final end of  nat~re.~  "  A  good will is that 
whereby alone his being can have an absolute worth, and in 
reference to which  the being of  the world  can have a final 
purpose."  But "  such realisation of  the supreme end through 
morality "-to  quote Dr. Caird's  Summary o£ Kant's  argu- 
ment-"  is no natural  sequence of  eEect or ceuse ; fnr  there 
is nothing in the connexion of  physical  causes that has any 
relation  to such an end.  We are forced  therefore by  the 
same moral  necessity which makes us set before us such an 
end, to postulate outside  of  Nature  a  Cause that determines 
nature so as finally to secure this result ;  and from this follows 
necessarily the idea of  an all-wise, all-powerful, all-righteous, 
all-merciful God."  We have  a "  pure  rnoral need  for  the 
existence of  such a Being ; and our moral needs differ from 
physical needs in that they have  an absolute claim to satis- 
f action ". 
The existence of  such a Deity is therefore, not a theoretical, 
but a practical postulate.+  This postulate compels us to think 
of  God "  as a.  rational Being, who  is guided  by 'the idea of 
an end  and who uses  Nature  as means  to t  ;  but  this 
conception rests on an imperfect  analogy : such separation 
of  means  and ends holds only from a human point  of  view. 
For "  though  "in  us morally practical reason is essentially 
different in its principles from  technically practical reason, 
we cannot assume that it must be so likewise in the supreme 
World-Cause, or that the divine intelligente, in subordinating 
nature to the final end,  needs to exert a  special kind of  causality, 
different  from that which i t exertti in producing those natural 
things which are ends to themselves.  While therefore we 
have in our own final purpose a mraZ ground for assuming a 
final purpose  of  creation  as an effect, we have not in the 
Same sense a wzorat  grou7d  for  assuming a  Moral Being as 
the source of  creation.  All  that we can say is thst, con- 
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sistently with the nature of our intelligenoe, we cannot make 
intelligible to ourselves the possibility of  such an adaptation 
of  Nature to the moral law and its object  as is involved in 
the final end which the moral law commands us to aim at- 
except by assuming the existence of a Creator and Governor 
of  the world, who is a moral legislator. 
Thus for Kant there is  no  theoretical  or  scientific proof 
of  the existence of  a moral Dejty-not  even  a working hy- 
pothesis : for a scientific hypothesis  must at least be certain 
of  the possibility  of  a given  phenomenon.  i.e. as a possible 
object of  sense perception.  The beiag of  God is a matter of 
faitk, but of  faith &s  grounded  in our reason as necessary for 
its self-deiermined ends.  And for Kant moral necessity has 
alwrtys an nbsolz~te  claim to which theoretical reason can make 
no pretence. 
No philosopher has really done more than Kant to prove 
the truth of  the  maxim  that the sciences  are Special  but 
philosophy is general ; and  yet at the Same time he was so 
steeped  in  the  psychology  of  separate  faculties,  that  his 
philosophy to the end  remained a sort of  System of  water- 
tight compartments with no channel of  communicstion from 
one to the other.  He so rigidly distinguislies between sense, 
understanding and  reason,  between  the  subject  and  the 
object, the a priori and the a  posteriori, the theoretical, prac- 
tical,  and ~sthetic,  the necessary and universal  as  against 
the contingent  and  particuhr, that  he never  succeeds  in 
bringing them together again, although the whole tendency 
af his teaching is to show that such distinctions are not ulti- 
mate, and that the real business of  philosophy is to discover 
8  principle of  unity whereby to overcome them. 
Science, it has been  well  sctid, must  treat  the world  of 
objects  as  self-subsistent in abstraction  from  the knowing 
subject.  Philosophy  must  start from  the ultimate  fact  of 
the duality of  subject and object in the unity of  experience 
and reinterpret the lessons of  the sciences, of  psychology, of 
ethics, of  reiigion in their relations to the thinking and willing 
subject.  It  cannot limit, as Kant always tends to do, experi- 
once to the sphere of  sense-perceptions; but it niust recognise 
that in all departments of  human activity and knowledge, in 
mathematics, in the natural sciences, in psychology, ethics, 
sociology, and religion, practical interest is an  essential ele- 
ment,  and that in all  experience  alike the  two factors are 
present, uiz., subject and  object:  and that everywhere alike 
consistency  of  all  the  elements with  the whole  and  with 
each other-the  elements both of knowledge and of  practice ;B  the only  and the ultimate  test  of  truth.  The funda- 
mental assumption of  all investigation is that the object, in 
whatever  sphere it may  be,  is intelligible, and from this it 
follows that so far as it is intelligible, just  so far is it an 
object made by mental construction.  Even mathematics is 
no exception.l  "  Exact reasoning " (in Mathernatics), actys 
Mr. Peirce, "  is a processl of  experiment performed upon an 
&rtificial  object, an object made lndeed bg the  mathematician, 
but  observed by  him just  as truly  a star or as a physi- 
ological process is observed by the Student of  another science, 
e~~erimented  upon  jixst  as truly as one  experiments in  a 
la,boratory."  >Ir. Schiller, too, in company with other well- 
known logicians, has recently  tried  to show us that axioms 
arid other so-called necessary truths are in their origin postu- 
lates and working hypotheses which  experience has shown 
us to work well, and that thei~  origin is to be found in our 
own  practical  needs  in  dealing  wlth  the world  of  objects 
around us.  Man  is the child  of Nature : and he can  only 
know Nature in so far as he can see himself in her, and only 
mttster  Nature in  so far as he can make her subserve and 
conform to bis practical needs.  His most fundamental ideas, 
space, time,  number, identity, similarity, causality, etc.!. a11 
have their origin in the contact of  his mind with other minds 
and natural objects, and he extends their dominion and believes 
in theii. validity just  so far as they are verified in his experi- 
ence.  Some of  them are exact, like number and measure, 
and as such they specially commend themselves to the &an 
of  science : others do not adrnit of  this exact expression and 
so are regarded  as of  less value  in soience, and fifinal  cause 
is a conception  of  the latter class.  Its origili in reflexion 
upon  the  conscious  process  of  man's  voluntary  actiona  is 
obvious.  By analogy man extended it to the acts of  animals 
and  plants,  even  to inorganic things,  and to the universe 
as a  whole: in some  cases he found the  conception  work 
well  as an hypothesis, in ot;hers ill; but  as in the case of 
other conceptions, so  here experience is the only test of  its 
validity and of  the extent of  its validity.  Hence we are now 
in a better  position  than were  Bacon,  Spinoza, and  Kant 
to estimate its value; for we have  Seen it applied with the 
most successful results in the biological sciences, which were 
practically non-existent in the lif etime of  those philosophers. 
It is  true that the biologist  in investigating the adaptation 
of organisucl to environment and of  environment to organism 
1 Quoted by Prof. Royce, The TVo~2d  ancl  the ~~z&vidziaZ,  i., 254. 
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by the process of  natural selection  does not  stop or need  to 
ask, whether such adaptation is the reault of  conscious design, 
Y>  .  end that he speaks of  the variations as due to "  chance,  z.e., 
to causes of  which he knows nothing or  little.  But to the 
philosopher this modest limitation of  the biological postulate 
makes but little difference.  As to the origin of  the concep- 
tion in the conscjous human will he has no doubt whatever, 
so  that the  success  of  the scientist's  application  of  final 
cause is for him a most  important piece of  evidence for the 
unity of  the active principle at work in Nature and in man. 
In Kantian language it shows him that final crtuse is no mere 
reflective judgment, no  mere illusory hypoLhesis, but a con- 
stituent element in Nature, just  as mnch as the prinoiple of 
causrtlity.  And  so it is with all. the principles which  the 
human intelligente uses  successfully to inake  the world  of 
nature intelligible  to itself.  As Dr. Caird puts it,l "  Thus 
we are led to think of  one principle undedying all differences, 
and  which,  through  the difference  and  apparent  external 
determination of  different material elements by  each other, 
is working towards the realisation of  itself ".  Man's science, 
man's philosophy, man's religion-all  arc anthropomorphic, 
and rightly so.  For the not-self  can  only exist in relation 
to the self, so  that the extensian of  knowledge and power 
over  the one element carries with it or rether is identical 
with the extension of  knowledge  and power over the other. 
Arcthropomrphio philosophy and science must slwsys be : but 
they must rest not on the transient sense-perceptions of  the 
individual man, but on the rationally constructed experienca 
of  the human race, 
1 Kant, ii., 641. 